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This paper considers price and location decisions of competing duopolists through an 
approach that integrates the traditional inside location and outside location model.  
One firm locates inside a linear city along with consumers while the other locates 
outside it.  We analyze a location-price simultaneous game as well as a location-then- 
price sequential game and characterize the equilibria in pure strategies. The transport 
cost are assumed to be linear-quadratic and borne by the consumers. We find the 
results are contrasting to the traditional inside and outside location models and the 
stability of the proposed model is intermediate between the two.   
 
Keywords: Inside-outside location model, spatial competition, product 
differentiation, transportation costs, cross-border shopping 
 











Competition in space arises because market activities occur at dispersed points in 
space.  The study of spatial competition has been well established since Hotelling 
(1929)’s pioneering work, with notable contributions by Prescott and Visscher (1977), 
d’Aspremont  et al. (1979), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986; 1992), de Palma et al. 
(1985), and Anderson (1988), inter alia. From the product differentiation perspective 
a location model can be used as a framework to depict horizontal product 
differentiation as well as vertical product differentiation by locating the firms in 
appropriate places. For example, in a linear city model, where consumers are 
uniformly distributed along the city, when firms are located within the city limits (e.g. 
within a unit interval) it is a model of horizontal product differentiation. In spatial 
economics, this framework is also known as inside location model. On the other hand, 
if firms are consecutively located outside the city limit on either side, it is a model of 
vertical product differentiation. This framework is also known as outside location 
model. The literature on spatial competition and product differentiation has widely 
used these two established frameworks in different contexts. However, a location 
model (in one dimension) where both the horizontal as well as vertical product 
differentiation characteristics can co-exit did not get much attention (except Tabuchi 
and Thisse (1995) and Lambertini (1997), see latter for a discussion on this). Thus, 
here we introduce a model that has the feature of both horizontal as well as vertical 
product differentiation by modifying Hotelling’s linear city paradigm.  We call this an 
inside-outside location model (or IO model). The proposed inside-outside location 
model integrates the pure inside location model and the pure outside location model in 
a specific manner. 
We have two firms, firm 1 and firm 2 located in separate linear markets of 
length  [] 1 , 0  and ][ +∞ , 1  respectively.  The market boundary is located at the point 1.  
Consumers are located only within one of the markets which constitute the linear city 
in this model. Here we assume consumers are located within [ ] 1 , 0  which constitutes 
the city. Consumers may travel to either of the two firms to purchase the product by 
incurring transportation cost.  We call firm 1 the inside firm (as it locates within city) 
and firm 2 the outside firm. Firm entry into rival market, however, is closed.  It will 
be shown that the only viable option for the outside firm is to locate in the vicinity of 
the market boundary.  Intuitively, proximity to the market boundary is crucial for the  
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outside firm to remain in competition with the inside firm by reducing the 
transportation costs incurred by the consumers, ceteris paribus.  
The inside-outside location model constructed here in this manner is reflective 
of many real world situations in which physical entry by firms into rival markets is 
either too costly or legally prohibitive, but product entry is not.  The outside firm 
either sells the product to consumers by transporting the good to them and charging 
them the delivered price, or synonymously, consumers travel across the market 
boundary to purchase the good.  In both instances, consumers pay the mill price plus 
transportation cost.  The first situation is reflective of trading nations or cities in 
which firms produce goods within their own precincts and ship them to neighbouring 
markets to be sold, while the second is reflective of cross-border shoppers who travel 
out of their domestic market to shop.  Our suggested model here is of the second type.  
For example, this model is applicable between two cities (or neighborhoods) in the 
study of cross-border shopping, a common phenomenon in the border regions of US 
and Canada, US and Mexico, several European countries, and Singapore and 
Malaysia in Southeast Asia (e.g., see Bode et al. 1994; Brodowsky and Anderson 
2003; Timothy and Butler 1995; Toh 1999).  This framework may also be adapted to 
the context of workers or tourists who travel to a neighbouring country or city to work 
or tour and return back after doing some shopping.  In the context of a single city, our 
proposed framework is applicable in the study of consumer shopper behaviour and 
retail outlet location, such as the competition between hyper marts (usually located 
just outside the city limits), and small and medium retail stores (often located within 
the city where the majority of the population lives). This framework is, therefore, able 
to capture certain types of markets and consumer shopping behaviour.    
As we mentioned before in this model when the markets are segregated 
geographically, we observe both horizontal and vertical product differentiation 
characteristics coexist. For example, at one extreme, when the inside firm locates at 
the market boundary at point 1 (i.e., closest to the outside firm), the model reduces to 
one that mainly exhibits strong vertical product differentiation characteristics.  At the 
other extreme, when the inside firm locates at 0 (i.e., furthest from the outside firm), 
strong horizontal product differentiation characteristics predominate.  At locations 
away from the endpoints of the inside firm, the model naturally displays both 
horizontal and vertical differentiation attributes.  
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From the literature of spatial competition, it is important to mention here that 
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Lambertini (1997) also considered a modified 
Hotelling duopoly framework where the firms are permitted to locate inside or beyond 
the city boundaries. However, we would like to point out that their modelling and 
main purposes of their analyses are quite different from the present problem. In 
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) the main purpose is to study the impact of consumer 
concentration around the market centre on the equilibrium locations of location-price 
games.  In Lambertini (1997) the main purpose is to endogenize the timing of moves 
with respect to the choice of location and price of the two competing firms. Another 
difference is, both Tabuchi and Thisse, and Lambertini in their analysis considered 
only quadratic transport cost for the consumers. In contrast, we consider here a linear-
quadratic transport cost for the consumers which naturally enable us to address the 
case of quadratic and linear transport costs as special cases of the main analysis. 
From the literature of marketing we can also draw a connection to this model 
in the following sense. Our model is essentially equivalent to a model used to capture 
brand loyalty. For certain location, the inside firm has brand loyalty as more 
consumers would prefer to buy from it compared to the outside firm at equal prices. 
Thus, this framework can also be used to study questions relating to brand loyalty. 
From a different point of view, it is also worth noting that the proposed IO 
model is directly applicable to adjoining market areas segmented economically and 
(or) geographically at the border.  It also highlights, as we will see in our analysis, the 
distinction between an economic boundary and geographical boundary between two 
regions, which in most of the cases do not necessarily coincide.  
    In this hybrid model, we find that price and location competition do not 
necessarily lead to the same results as in the pure inside or outside location model.  
We study all the contrasting findings and pure-strategy equilibria in prices and 
locations under linear, quadratic and linear-quadratic transportation costs.  We also 
find that the proposed inside-outside location model possesses stability that is 
intermediate between the two pure location models. 
   The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the inside-outside 
location model. In section 3, we solve for the equilibrium prices under parametric 
locations of firms. In section 4, we consider the simultaneous price-location game 
between the two firms. In section 5, we consider the location-then-price sequential 
game. Section 6 concludes.   
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2.  THE INSIDE-OUTSIDE LOCATION MODEL 
We examine the duopolistic competition between firms selling a homogeneous 
product in two adjoining markets with entry-barrier to the rival’s market. Two 
contiguous straight lines represent two markets  { } 2 , 1 ∈ i  that sell the product with no 
storage, distribution or production costs.  Market 1 is denoted by the bounded unit 
interval  [] 1 , 0  along which firm 1 (the inside firm) and all consumers are located.       
Market 2 is denoted by the unbounded interval ] [ +∞ , 1  along which firm 2 (the outside 
firm) locates.  The two markets meet at the market boundary situated at point 1 and 
together constitute a continuous straight line of infinite length (although an upper 
bound in location is necessary for firm 2 to remain viable, as will be shown in Section 
3).  Consumers are uniformly distributed along [ ] 1 , 0  with density one.  Firm 1 is 
located at distance  1 x  from the left endpoint of the line, i.e.,  [ ] 1 , 0 1 ∈ x , while firm 2 is 
located at distance  2 x  outside the unit interval with  ] [ +∞ ∈ , 1 2 x .  In the next section we 
are going to assume that the two firms have fixed locations and compete only in 
prices.  This assumption of fixed location will be relaxed in Sections 4 and 5.  Each 
consumer buys one unit of the product from the firm charging the lower full price, 
i.e., mill price plus transportation costs.  Price ties are resolved in favour of the nearer 
firm.  Consumers are assumed to bear the transportation costs.  Let  ) (d c  denote the 
transportation cost function which is continuous, increasing and convex (weakly or 
strongly) in distance d  and presents itself as one of three forms: linear, quadratic and 
linear-quadratic, with  () 0 0 = c .  Let  1 p  and  2 p  denote the mill price of firm 1 and firm 









Figure 1     Geographical configuration of the marginal consumer and firms 
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2.1 MARKET AND DEMAND 
Let  () 2 1, p p m  be the “marginal consumer”  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ y  who is perfectly indifferent 
between travelling to firm 1 or firm 2 satisfying 
   () ( ) y x c p x y c p − + = − + 2 2 1 1  
and is unique whenever he exists. 
  The market is segmented at  ( ) 2 1, p p m : consumers located in  () [] 2 1, , 0 p p m  buy 
from firm 1 while those in  ( ) [ ] 1 , , 2 1 p p m  buy from firm 2.  If  ( ) 2 1, p p m  does not exist, 
then either of the following two conditions holds: 
(1)   () ( ) y x c p x y c p − + < − + 2 2 1 1 for all  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ y ,   or 
(2)   () ( ) y x c p x y c p − + > − + 2 2 1 1 for all  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ y . 
In the first case, firm 1 serves the whole market at price  1 p  while in the second 
case, the whole market is served by firm 2 at price  2 p .  The strategies of this two-
player game are  [ [ +∞ ∈ , 0 1 p  and  [ [ +∞ ∈ , 0 2 p  with the payoff function of firm 1 is 
given by 






dz z f p     if  ( ) 2 1, p p m  exists, 
           =  1 p        if equation (1) holds, 
   = 0        if equation (2) holds 
while the payoff function of firm 2 is given by  




2 1 p p m
dz z f p    if  ( ) 2 1, p p m  exists, 
           =  2 p        if equation (2) holds, 





























    
Figure 2     Full price paid by consumers at various locations in [] 1 , 0      
              under linear transportation costs 
 
Assuming linear transportation costs, figure 2 illustrates the full price of the 
good at various locations of the consumer given the cost schedule ABC if he buys 
from firm 1 and DF if he buys from firm 2.  The bold line ABEF depicts the lowest 
full price at any given location.  The intersection of the two cost schedules at  y 
denotes the location of the marginal consumer.  It is obvious from the figure that for 
the marginal consumer to exist, he must locate in [ ] 1 , 1 x . 
  Under the type of cost structures we are considering here, we take the most 
general form of cost function (i.e. the linear-quadratic form)  ( )
2 sd td d c + =  where 
() 0 0 = c and  0 , > s t  for our analysis. The linear cost case (when  0 s = ) and the 
quadratic cost case (when  0 d = ) will be special cases of it. We will report the results 
from these two special cases wherever appropriate. 
 
3. PRICE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER PARAMETRIC LOCATIONS 
If  () 2 1, p p m  exists, it must be the solution of the equation 




1 1 1 y x s y x t p x y s x y t p − + − + = − + − + . 
Solving, we obtain the demand functions for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, as 
Full price 
Location 
0  1 x y 1  2 x 
() 2 2 x c p +  
() 1 1 x c p +  
1 p  
() 1 2 2 − + x c p  
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with the payoff functions given by  ( )( ) 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 , , p p m p p p ⋅ = ∏  and 
() () 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 , , p p m p p p ⋅ = ∏  respectively.  Maximizing profits on the part of firm 1 and  




1 = ∂ ∏ ∂ i i p p p  where  { } 2 , 1 = i , gives the following best response 
functions: 






x x x x s t p p + − + + =    and 







x x x x s t p p − − − + + = .  
Solving equations (5) and (6) gives the non-cooperative Bertrand-Nash price 
equilibrium in pure strategies 





















x x s t
x x
x x s t
p p . 
For non-zero 
*
2 p , we assume that  4 2 1 < + x x .  In other words, the upper bound on the 
location of firm 2 for it to remain viable is  1 2 4 x x − < .  If  4 2 1 = + x x , an equilibrium 
exists at  














x x s t
p p .   
Intuitively, this means that when the distance between the two firms becomes too 
large, firm 1 becomes a monopoly and gains the whole market while firm 2 drops out 
of the competition.  The distribution of market demand between firm 1 and firm 2 at 
Nash equilibrium is obtained by substituting equation (7) into equations (3) and (4) 
giving  















, x x x x m m . 
Equation (8) shows that the equilibrium demand is dependent only on the location of 
the two firms. 
A similar exposition can be conducted for the cases in which transportation 
costs are linear of the form  ( ) td d c =  where  ( ) 0 0 = c  and  0 > t , and quadratic of the 
form  ()
2 sd d c =  where  () 0 0 = c and  0 > s . The results for these two cases are reported  
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in Table 1.  In both instances,  0
*
2 > p  whenever  4 2 1 < + x x .  Under linear 
transportation costs, however, a unique equilibrium exists if and only if 
() () ( ) 3 2 2 4 3 2 2 1
2
2 1 x x x x − + ≥ + +  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 2 1 4 3 4 2 1
2
2 1 x x x x − + ≥ − −  when 
4 2 1 ≤ + x x .  (The complete analysis of these two cases is available upon request). 
In Table 1, we report the equilibrium prices and equilibrium demands for non-
zero 
*
2 p , for all possible transport costs considered for the IO model along with the 
contrasting results for the pure inside location and outside location models. 
It is obvious from the results that the inside-outside (IO) model shares some of 
the features of the pure inside location model as well as the pure outside location 
model.  The equilibrium price and demand are the same for the IO model and the 
inside location model for all transportation costs considered, and are identical for the 
IO model and the outside location model under quadratic transportation costs.   
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  Price Equilibrium  Demand Equilibrium 
Inside Location Model 
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Outside Location Model 








1 = m m  













, x x x x
s



















, x x x x m m  










= t x x s
x x
t x x s
x x














































Inside-Outside Location Model 

































, x x x x m m  













, x x x x
s




















, x x x x m m  




















x x s t
x x
x x s t















, x x x x m m  
Table 1 
Equilibrium prices and demands of the inside, outside and IO models under various 







With regard to transportation costs structures, we have the following result in the IO 
model whenever a solution exists in pure strategies with non-zero prices (see 
Appendix 1 for the proofs). 
 
Proposition 1 




2 p p  is independent of 
the transportation cost structure. 
 
Note:  
When transportation costs are linear, a unique price equilibrium exists if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3 2 2 4 3 2 2 1
2
2 1 x x x x − + ≥ + +  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 2 1 4 3 4 2 1
2





1 = = p p  when  1 2 1 = + x x  for the inside location model (see d’Aspremont et al. 1979); the same 
condition is true for the IO model when  4 2 1 ≤ + x x .  A unique price equilibrium exists for all location pairs 
() 2 1, x x  of the outside location model.  
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Corollary 1 
In equilibrium, relative demand is equivalent to relative prices. 
 
The equilibrium relative price of the good offered by the outside firm to the inside 
firm is an indication of the “exchange rate” of the good at the two sources.   
Intuitively, Proposition 1 means that when firm locations are fixed, the outside 
(inside) firm is able to attract the consumer by offering the good at the same relative 
price (relative to that offered by the inside (outside) firm) regardless of the nature of 
the transportation costs faced by the consumers.   
Corollary 1 can be interpreted as follows.  The relative market demand, which 
reflects the market area of the two firms, delineates the market boundary that is 
determined solely by the relative price in the IO model.  
Looking at Table 1 we see that these results also apply to the inside location 
model.  In the inside location model, the relative price and relative demand under the 
three transportation cost structures are also equivalent.  The result, however, are not 
valid for the outside location model. 
 
Now we relax the assumption of parametric location and allow the firms to choose 
locations as well. In the next section, we will consider a price-location simultaneous 
move game and in the following section we consider a location-then-price sequential 
move game in between the two firms.   
 
4. THE SIMULTANEOUS PRICE-LOCATION GAME 
When firms choose price and location together, we have a simultaneous price-location 
game.  The choice of both price and location simultaneously in one period is 
reflective of situations in which players commit to a price for a period as long as the 
product lifetime.  For example, firms like chain stores publish a catalogue and stick to 
it for a while.   
In the simultaneous move game, the strategy pairs are ( ) 1 1,x p  for the inside 
firm 1 and () 2 2,x p  for the outside firm 2, with  [ [ +∞ ∈ , 0 , 2 1 p p ,  [] 1 , 0 1 ∈ x  and 
][ +∞ ∈ , 1 2 x .  The Nash equilibrium in prices and locations is one in which no firm 
wishes to change its price and/or location given the price and location it anticipates 
the other firm will choose.  The payoff function for firm 1 at equilibrium satisfies  
 11












1 1 , , , , , , x p x p x p x p ∏ ≥ ∏  
for all  [] 1 , 0 1 ∈ x  and  0 1 ≥ p , while the payoff function for firm 2 satisfies 












1 2 , , , , , , x p x p x p x p ∏ ≥ ∏  
for all  ][ +∞ ∈ , 1 2 x  and  0 2 ≥ p . 
It is readily verified that the only pure strategy equilibrium for the simultaneous game 
involves  [] 1 , 0
*
1 ∈ x  and  ε + =1
*
2 x  where  0 > ε  is a small constant close to zero 
representing a physical divide.
1  In other words, the dominant location strategy for 
firm 2 is to locate at  ε + =1
*
2 x .  It is easy to note that any other feasible location of 
firm 2 will result in lower profit.   
Under linear-quadratic transportation costs, the profit functions of firm 1 and firm 2 
are given by the following equations respectively: 







2 2 1 1 1 2 2
, , , p
x x
x x s t
p p p





= ∏  







2 2 1 1 2 2
2
2
, , , p
x x
x x s t
p p p





= ∏ . 
Firm 1 maximizes profit by choosing 
*
1 x  with the first order condition given by 






























x x s t
p p s p
x
x p x p
. 




















2 x x x x s t p − − − + =  (obtained 
from equation (7) by maximising the respective firm’s profit with respect to price) 
into the above gives 
















⎛ + + − + +
s
t
x x x x
s . 








1 = + + − s t x x .  In other 
words, the equilibrium location of firm 1 is at  













which gives the response function in location of firm 1.   
In the case of firm 2, it maximises profit by choosing 
*
2 x  such that 
                                                      
1 For example, a physical divide between countries or cities could be a sea, a mountain etc or legal 
restrictions. When 0 = ε , the market boundary at 1 represents a seamless economic and (or) 
geographical border between the two markets.  In the ensuing discussions, we assume that  0 > ε .   
  
 12






























x x s t
p p s p
x






1 p p >  from equation (7) for all  4 2 1 < + x x .  This implies that firm 2 increases 
profit by moving towards the market border, i.e.,  ε + =1
*
2 x ,  0 > ε .  Solving for 
*
1 x  by 
substituting  ε + =1
*
2 x  into equation (11) gives  ( ) 5 1 5 3
*
1 ε + + = s t x .  For a unique 
equilibrium in location to exist,  1
*
1 ≤ x  or  3 2 ≤ s t .  The equilibrium prices are 
obtained by substituting 
*
1 x  and 
*
2 x  into equation (7) so that 
(12)              ( ) [] [ ] ε ε s s t s t t s p 2 7 2 25 4 7 6 25 2
*
1 + + + + + = ; and  
                      ( ) [] [ ] ε ε s s t s t t s p 2 3 2 25 4 3 4 25 2
*
2 + − − − + = .   
 
Proposition 2 
The simultaneous price-location equilibrium in pure strategies under linear-quadratic 
transportation costs  is given by 




,,, 6 7 272, 1 , 4 3 232, 1
25 25 5 25 25
tt t




⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ + + + + + + + − − − + + ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
where  0 > ε .   
 
The simultaneous price-location equilibrium in pure strategies under quadratic 
transportation costs is reported in Table 2. (The complete analysis is available upon 
request).  Moreover, we find that there is a non-existence problem of the simultaneous 
price-location game under linear transport costs (see appendix 2 for details).  
 
4.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The results of the simultaneous move game for the IO model are summarised in Table 
2, along with the comparative equilibrium strategies for the pure inside location and 
outside location models.  We know that no simultaneous price-location equilibrium in 
pure strategies can exist in the inside location model while the simultaneous price-
location equilibrium in pure strategies for the outside location model is for the two 








1 = = p p  (see Gabszewicz and 
Thisse 1992).
2  The IO model, with the horizontal differentiation characteristics of the 
                                                      
2 de Palma et al. (1985), however, showed that a simultaneous price-location equilibrium exists in the 
inside location model if the product is heterogeneous enough.  Anderson et al. (1992) further showed  
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inside location model, has the same instability problem as the inside location model 
under linear transportation costs.  Incorporating the vertical differentiation 
characteristics of the outside location model, however, has rendered the IO model 
greater stability than the pure inside location model in that an equilibrium in pure 
strategies exists when the transportation cost structure is quadratic and linear-
quadratic.   
 
Table 2 
Simultaneous price-location equilibrium of the inside, outside and IO models under 























                                                                                                                                                        
that the only symmetric pure strategy equilibrium occurs when both firms agglomerate at the market 
centre. 
 Location  Equilibrium  Price  Equilibrium 
Inside Location Model 
( ) td d c =   No equilibrium exists  No equilibrium exists 
2 ) ( sd d c =   No equilibrium exists  No equilibrium exists 
2 ) ( sd td d c + =   No equilibrium exists  No equilibrium exists 
Outside Location Model 








1 = p p  








1 = p p  








1 = p p  
Inside-Outside Location Model 
() td d c =  
No equilibrium exists  No equilibrium exists 





















1 2 5 2
25
4
, 2 5 3
25
4
, ε ε ε ε
s s
p p  






























































t s s s t
s
t


















  Note:  
When transportation costs are linear-quadratic, a unique equilibrium in location exists whenever 
3 2 ≤ s t  for the IO model.  
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5. THE SEQUENTIAL LOCATION-PRICE GAME 
Now we consider a two-stage process in which the location is chosen first in full 
anticipation of the ensuing price equilibrium, followed by the price in the second 
stage, where prices are decided based on the location choice made in the first stage.  
The solution to the sequential game is worked out using backward induction.  In a 
subgame consisting of the second stage, a non-cooperative price equilibrium in pure 
strategies with prices  () 2 1
*
1 ,x x p  and  ( ) 2 1
*
2 ,x x p  are chosen for given locations  1 x  and 
2 x .  The pure strategy equilibrium to the first-stage location game is the pair of 








1 , , , , , x x x x p x x p i ∏  
where  {} 2 , 1 = i .  This profit function is well defined whenever the price equilibrium 
exists and is unique.  The full (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the game is then given 
























2 ,x x p p = .   
We have shown earlier that when  4 2 1 < + x x , the unique price equilibrium in pure 
strategies is given by equation (7), i.e., 






















, , , x x
x x s t
x x
x x s t
x x p x x p . 
The profit function of the inside firm 1 is given by 







2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
, , , , , p
x x
x x s t
p p p





= ∏ . 
Substituting equation (13) gives 










, , , , , + +
− +
= ∏ x x
x x s t
x x x x p x x p . 
Optimising with respect to  1 x  gives 
   () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () 2 3 2
18


















x x s t
x x
x
x x x x p x x p
. 








2 < − − + x x s t  or  
















1 1 < ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p  which implies that as  1 x  
decreases, firm 1’s profit increases so that firm 1’s optimal location is at the point 0.  
If the converse of equation (14) holds, then two instances can arise: either  
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1 1 = ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p .  If the former holds, then           
firm 1’s profit is maximised by locating at point 1. 
Now consider the profit function for the outside firm 2 which is given by 







2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
2
, , , , , p
x x
x x s t
p p p





= ∏ . 
Substituting equation (13) gives 










, , , , , x x
x x s t
x x x x p x x p − −
− +
= ∏ . 
Optimising with respect to  2 x  gives 
   () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () t x x s
x x
x
x x x x p x x p
2 4 3
18



























1 2 = ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p , 














1 = + − . 




1 1 < ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p  and  0
*
1 = x .  
Substituting  0
*
1 = x  into equation (15) and solving gives  s t x 3 2 3 4
*
2 − = .  Since 
][ +∞ ∈ , 1 2 x , the condition for 
*
2 x  to hold is that  ½ < s t . 
We will now show that the converse of equation (14) is never valid.  Suppose 








1 1 > ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p  and  1
*
1 = x .  
Substituting  1
*
1 = x  into equation (15) and solving gives  s t x 3 2 3 5
*
2 − = .  This 
solution, however, cannot exist because it contradicts the assumed condition that 




1 x x s t + + > .  Substituting  1
*
1 = x  and  s t x 3 2 3 5
*
2 − =  gives  2 5 > s t .  This 
condition, however, suggests that  0 3 2 3 5
*
2 < − = s t x  which cannot hold since 
][ +∞ ∈ , 1 2 x .   




1 1 = ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p  also cannot hold.  Suppose 




1 1 = ∂ ∏ ∂ x x x p p .  In that case, equation (14) becomes 




1 = + − .  Solving this equation together with equation (15) 
gives  4 1 2
*
1 − = s t x  and  s t x 2 4 5
*
2 − = .  By assumption of the model, we have 
[] 1 , 0 1 ∈ x  and  ][ +∞ ∈ , 1 2 x .  Consequently,  4 1 2
*
1 − = s t x  implies that  [] 2
5 ½, ∈ s t  and 
s t x 2 4 5
*
2 − =  implies that  ½ < s t , which contradicts  [ ] 2
5 ½, ∈ s t .  
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The only solution in pure strategies to the first-stage of the sequential game is, 




1 − =  for  4 2 1 < + x x  and  ½ < s t .  The second-stage game 
is then solved by substituting 
*
1 x  and 
*
2 x  into equation (13).  The equilibrium price 
pair in pure strategies is given by 




1 s t t s s t t s p p + + − + =  
 
Proposition 3 
The subgame perfect equilibrium to the sequential game in pure strategies under 

























































where  4 2 1 < + x x  and  ½ < s t . 
 
The equilibrium of the sequential game in pure strategies under quadratic 
transportation costs is reported in Table 3 (analysis available upon request). There is 
also a non-existence problem of the sequential game under linear transport costs (see 
appendix 3 for details).   
 
5.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The results of the sequential game for the IO model are summarized in Table 3, along 
with the comparative equilibrium strategies for the pure inside and outside location 
models.  When transportation costs are linear or linear-quadratic, no equilibrium in 
pure strategies can exist in the inside location model, while the equilibrium in pure 
strategies for the outside location model always exists (see Gabszewicz and Thisse 
1992).  As in the pure inside location model, it is shown that an equilibrium in pure 
strategies also fails to exist for the sequential game of the IO model when 
transportation costs are linear.  However, unlike the inside location model which 
possesses an equilibrium for the sequential game when transportation costs are 
quadratic but not when they are linear or linear-quadratic (d’Aspremont et al. 1979; 
Anderson 1988), an equilibrium always exists for the IO model whenever 
transportation costs are strictly convex.  
When transportation costs are quadratic, the Principle of Maximum 
Differentiation is established in the inside location model as well as the IO model.   
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Simply put, the Principle of Maximum Differentiation states that two firms have a 
tendency to locate in opposite directions towards the end points of the linear city as a 








1 = x x  respectively, 
firms in the inside and IO model exhibit greater tendency of differentiation under 
quadratic transportation costs. 
When faced with linear-quadratic transportation costs, firms in the outside 
location model and IO models make their location decisions based on all the 
parameters of the model.  In the case of the outside location model, some tendency of 
increasing differentiation is observed although its intensity is lower than that under 
quadratic transportation costs.  Similarly, the IO model reflects a tendency toward 
increasing differentiation which loses its intensity because of the linear-quadratic 
transportation cost function.  
 
Table 3 
Equilibrium in the sequential game of the inside, outside and IO models under various 


















  Location Equilibrium  Price Equilibrium 
Inside Location Model 
() td d c =   no equilibrium exists  no equilibrium exists 








1 =  
2 ) ( sd td d c + =   no equilibrium exists  no equilibrium exists 
Outside Location Model 








1 = p p  





























p p  






























































Inside-Outside Location Model 
() td d c =   no equilibrium exists  no equilibrium exists 





























p p  

































































When transportation costs are linear-quadratic, a unique equilibrium in location exists whenever the 
following conditions hold: (a) outside location model:  2 ≤ s t ; and (b) IO model:  ½ < s t .  
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5.2 STABILITY 
One interesting observation that surfaced under parametric firm location is that the 
results of the IO model and the inside location model are identical for all 
transportation costs considered, and for the IO model and the outside location model 
when transportation costs are quadratic.  On the other hand, under variable firm 
locations and linear transportation costs, the results of the IO model and the inside 
location model are identical to a certain extent, i.e., there is a non-existence of 
equilibrium problem.  However, the non-existence problem dissipates in the IO model 
when price and location decisions are made simultaneously under quadratic and 
linear-quadratic transportation costs while it persists in the inside location model.   
Moreover, the IO model does not suffer from the non-existence problem as the inside 
location model when the game is played sequentially under linear-quadratic 
transportation costs.  These result contrasts with the outside location model where a 
solution always exists when location is variable.  Thus, the stability of the IO model 
can be said to be intermediate between the inside location model and the outside 
location model.  This is not that surprising since the IO location model is an 
integration of the two models. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Product differentiation due to firms’ locations at the boundary regions of countries or 
cities is of pertinent significance and interest to various segments of society because 
of its attendant economic benefits and trickle down effects on the rest of the economy.  
The inside-outside location model presented here offers a simple framework for 
understanding and analysing the location and pricing decisions of firms situated on 
either side of the border, as well as the purchase and travel decisions of consumers 
between the inside firm and the outside firm.  The IO model is readily applicable for 
analysing cross-border shopping behaviour which is a common phenomenon in 
various parts of the world. From the marketing discipline this is also a framework in 
which economics of brand loyalty can be studied. 
As such, the IO model is directly applicable to situations in which adjoining 
markets are segmented geographically and (or) economically.  It also highlights the 
distinction between an economic boundary and geographical boundary between two 
regions, which in most cases do not necessarily coincide.    
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APPENDIX 1  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 AND COROLLARY 1 
Proposition 1 
When the transportation cost structure is linear, i.e., when  ( ) td d c = ,  0 > t , the unique 
price equilibrium in pure strategies exists at the pair of prices 

















p p  
The equilibrium relative price of the good is given by 


























When transportation costs are quadratic, i.e., when  ( )
2 sd d c = ,  0 > s , the unique 
equilibrium in pure strategies exists at the pair of prices 













, x x x x
s
x x x x
s
p p . 
The equilibrium relative price of the good is given by 
(A2)   () ( )
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In the case of linear-quadratic transportation costs, i.e., when  ( )
2 sd td d c + = ,  0 > t  and 
0 > s , the unique equilibrium in pure strategies exists at the pair of prices 





















x x s t
x x
x x s t
p p . 
The equilibrium relative price of the good is given by 
(A3)   () [] ( )
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Equations (A1), (A2) and (A3) are all equivalent. 
QED. 
Corollary 1 
The equilibrium demand is the same for all transportation costs and is given by 




























































2 p p m m =  for all transportation cost 
functions.                                                                                                                 QED. 
 
APPENDIX 2 
I.  EQUILIBRIUM  PRICES UNDER PARAMETRIC  LOCATIONS WITH LINEAR 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS 
Assume that the transportation cost function is linear of the form  ( ) cd t d = , where 
() 0 0 = c and  0 > t .  If  () 2 1, p p m  exists, it must be the solution of the equation 
   ( ) ( ) 11 2 2 p ty x p tx y +−= + − . 
Solving, we obtain the demand functions for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, as 
(A5)   () ( )
2 2
,









=    and 















The payoff functions are given by  ( )( ) 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 , , p p m p p p ⋅ = ∏  and 
() () 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 , , p p m p p p ⋅ = ∏  respectively.  Maximizing profits on the part of firm 1 and firm 
2 gives the following response functions: 






x x t p p + + =      and 







x x t p p − − + = . 
Solving equations A7 and A8 gives the non-cooperative Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium in 
pure strategies, i.e.,  

















p p . 
 
II. Equilibrium Non-Existence – Simultaneous Price-Location game with Linear 
Transport Costs 
We will now turn to the non-existence problem of the simultaneous price-location 
game when both firms face linear transportation costs.  Assume that transportation  
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costs are linear of the form  ( ) td d c =  where  ( ) 0 0 = c and  0 > t .  The profit functions of 
firm 1 and firm 2 are given by the following equations respectively: 





2 2 1 1 1 2 2








= ∏  





2 2 1 1 2 2
2
2








= ∏ . 
Firm 1 chooses the optimal location 
*
1 x  that maximises its profit.  Since 











x p x p
, 
firm 1 raises its profit by moving towards firm 2 which gives its equilibrium location 
as  1
*
1 = x .  At the same time, firm 2’s dominant strategy is to choose  ε + =1
*
2 x .  This 
is obvious from maximising firm 2’s profit with respect to location which gives 











x p x p
. 
As a result, firm 2 increases its profit by moving towards the market boundary.  The 
equilibrium location of firm 2 is then given by  ε + =1
*
2 x ,  0 > ε  is a small constant.  
Substituting 
*
1 x  and 
*
2 x  into firm 1 and firm 2’s response function (equations (A7) and 
(A8)) gives  () ε + = 4 3
*
1 t p  and  ( ) ε − = 2 3
*
2 t p .  This price configuration is not possible 
for the two firms located next to each other.  Their attempt to undercut each other and 
relax price competition by moving apart naturally generates instability in the location 
choice of the two firms.  The simultaneous price-location equilibrium in pure 
strategies, therefore, does not exist when transportation costs are linear. 
 
APPENDIX 3      
Equilibrium Non-Existence – Sequential Location-Price game with Linear Transport 
Costs 
We now turn to the non-existence problem in the sequential game which resurfaces 
under linear transportation costs.  Under linear transportation costs when  4 2 1 < +x x , 
the unique price equilibrium in pure strategies is given by equation (A9), i.e., 

















p p . 
The profit function of firm 1 is given by  
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2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2








= ∏ . 
Substituting equation (A10) gives 
   () () () ()
2






, , , , , + + = ∏ x x
t
x x x x p x x p . 
Optimising with respect to  1 x  gives 
   () ( ) ( ) () 0 2
9















x x x x p x x p
 




1 > + + x x .  Since firm 1’s profit increases as  1 x  increases, it 
maximises profit by locating at point 1. 
Now consider the profit function for firm 2 which is given by 





2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
2








= ∏ . 
Substituting equation (A10) gives 
   () () () ()
2






, , , , , x x
t
x x x x p x x p − − = ∏ . 
Optimising with respect to  2 x  gives 
   () ( ) ( ) () 0 4
9















x x x x p x x p
 




1 < + x x .  In other words, firm 2’s profit increases as  2 x  decreases 
so that it maximises profit by locating at point  ε + 1  where ε  is a small constant.  The 
solution in pure strategies to the first-stage of the sequential game is, therefore, 




1 x x  for  4 2 1 < + x x .   
The second-stage game is then solved by substituting 
*
1 x  and 
*
2 x  into equation 
(A10).  The equilibrium price pair in pure strategies is then given by 




1 t t p p ε ε − + = .  This is again not possible as the price differential 
creates opportunities for both firms that are situated next to each other to engage in a 
price war and undercut each other, and relax price competition by moving apart, 
giving rise to instability in the location choice of the two firms.  As with the 
simultaneous game, therefore, an equilibrium of the sequential game in pure strategies 
does not exist when transportation costs are linear. 
 